Abstract-Recently, a medical privacy protection scheme (MPPS) based on DNA encoding and chaos was proposed in [IEEE Trans. Nanobioscience, vol. 16, pp. 850-858, 2017]. This paper reports some properties of MPPS and proposes a chosenplaintext attack on it. In addition, the other claimed superiorities are questioned from the viewpoint of modern cryptography. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to support the feasibility of the attack and other security defects. The proposed cryptanalysis will promote proper application of DND encoding in protecting multimedia data including DICOM image.
control parameters; switching among multiple chaotic maps; cascading multiple chaotic maps [21] , [22] . The review on chaotic cryptology can be found in [23] - [25] .
In [26] , a medical privacy protection scheme (MPPS) based on DNA and chaos was proposed. The images stored as DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard are encrypted with DNA encoding and PRNSs generated by iterating two Coupled Chaotic Systems (CCS).
This paper focuses on security analysis of MPPS. Some properties on its essential structure are found and proved, which is then used to support an efficient chosen-plaintext attack. The metrics on validating security performance of MPPS are convincingly questioned.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II concisely present the medical privacy protection scheme under study. Detailed cryptanalyses are given in Sec. III with experimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
II. THE CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF MPPS
As specified in [26, Sec. III] , MPPS can protect DICOM image data with two modes: partial and full encryption. If the former is adopted, only the significant areas for diagnosis are encrypted to considerably reduce the size of the encryption object. Except the difference on selected portions of the plain-image, MPPS works exactly the same under the two modes. Without loss of generality, the encryption object of MPPS is assumed to be a RGB color image I = {I r , I g , I b } of size M × N for either mode, which can be represented with three two-dimensional 8-bit integer matrixes:
. Accordingly, I = {I r , I g , I b } is the cipherimage, where I r = {I r (i, j)}
and I b = {I b (i, j)} M,N i=1,j=1 . Then, the basic parts of MPPS can be described as follows 1 .
• The secret key is composed of six sets of initial value and control parameter {(Y m (0), µ m )} 
where
is the Logistic map. The other sub-keys, K 2 , K 4 , K 5 and • Initialization:
1) Generating index sequence: iterate CLS map (1) t 1 times from the initial condition Y 1 (0) with control parameter µ 1 to avoid the transient effect; iterate it 3·M ·N more times to obtain a chaotic state sequence
; sort X 1 in an ascending order to generate an index sequence
satisfying that X 1 (S 1 (i)) is the i-th largest element of X 1 . 2) Determining DNA coding rules: iterate the CLT map (3) with control parameter µ 2 from the initial condition Y 2 (0) t 2 = 100 times to avoid the transient effect; iterate it six more times to obtain a chaotic sequence
and quantize it to get six random numbers
where x returns the nearest integers less than or equal to x. 3) Constructing a pseudo-random number generator: starting from the initial condition Y 3 (0), iterate CLT map (3) t 3 times with control parameter µ 3 ; iterate the map 4 · M · N more times to obtain a chaotic sequence
and quantize to a binary random sequence
4) Generating three keystreams S 4 , S 5 , S 6 : Similar to 1), set three sub-keys K 4 , K 5 and K 6 as the control parameter and initial state of CLS map (1), generate three chaotic sequences
, respectively. As above, the first t m states are discarded for generating S m , where m = 4, 5, 6. Then, every element of such sequences is quantified by
• Encryption procedure: a) Permutation: the three matrixes I r , I g , and I b are "placed" vertically to obtain a large image P = [P (i, j)]
, where the elements of [P (i, j)]
are set by that of I r , I g , and I b pixel by pixel, respectively. Then, produce a scrambled image P = {P (i, j)} 3M,N i=1,j=1 from P by the index sequence S 1 : P (i, j) = P (u, v), where 
into four neighboring elements of 2-bit integer matrixes of size M × 4N , I r , I g , and I b , respectively. Finally, convert I r , I g , and I b into DNA symbol matrixes with the rules in the E 1 -th, E 2 -th, and E 3 -th row of Table I , respectively. Let R, G, and B denote the corresponding results. c) Diffusion I with DNA complement:
d) Diffusion II: According to DNA addition operation rules given in the Table II , calculate
Then, convert DNA symbol matrixes R * * , G * * , and B * * into 2-bit integer matrixes with the rule in the D 1 -th, D 2 -th, and D 3 -th rows of B * * , respectively. Accordingly, B * * , B * * , and B * * are generated. Finally, transform R , G , and B into I * * r , I * * g , and I * * b , respectively. In such transforms, every four 2-bit integer elements are merged into one 8-bit integer with the inverse function of Eq. (7). f) Diffusion III: Considering every 2-D matrix as a 1-D sequence by scanning it in the raster order, obtain I r , I g , I b by calculating
for i = 1 ∼ M N , ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive OR operation, I r (0) = 0, I g (0) = 0 and I b (0) = 0.
• Decryption procedure: The decryption procedure is the inverse of the above encryption procedure. The DNA subtraction rules are shown in Table III . 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF MPPS
In this section, some properties related to MPPS and DNA coding are first analyzed. Then a detailed cryptanalysis under chosen-plaintext attack is proposed. Next attack process and simulation results are given. Evaluation on other attack analysis is finally presented.
A. Some properties of MPPS
Before the cryptanalysis, some properties of MPPS and DNA encoding/decoding are analyzed and summarized.
, their difference ∆C is independent of the keys or equivalent keys
Proof: Observing Eq. (11), one has
Hence the property is proved.
For convenience, here we define two composite functions
j (x) and g(x) are the DNA coding, decoding and transformation mentioned in the previous section, where x ∈ Z 4 and i, j ∈ Z 8 . Property 2. If x 1 , x 2 ∈ x and x 1 ⊕ x 2 = (11) 2 = 3,
Proof: Considering the complementary of DNA (i.e., A and T, C and G), for i ∈ Z 8 , there exists
According to Eq. (9), one has
Property 3. The composite functions F i,j (x) and G i,j (x) are bidirectional maps defined in domain Z 4 , and they only have 8 and 16 different maps, respectively.
are also fixed bidirectional maps. Considering the constraints of Eq. (14), one can determine the number of satisfied maps of F i,j (x) and
for x = 0, 1, 2, 3, where λ = 1, 2 or 3.
Proof:
The above proposition is equivalent to another proposition: if F i1,j1 (x) is one of maps of
The proof is similar to that of Property 4. Original keys
B. Breaking MPPS under chosen-plaintext attack
The corresponding equivalent keys and related information of the six keys of MPPS are shown in Table IV . The goal of cryptanalysis of the paper is to reveal these equivalent keys under chosen-plaintext attack.
First, we choose a group of color plain-images whose all pixel values are equal, represented as a set of images P = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P 255 } where P 0 = {0, 0, 0, . . . , 0}, P 1 = {1, 1, 1, . . . , 1} and P 255 = {255, 255, 255, . . . , 255}. Suppose their corresponding cipher-images set is C = {C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C 255 }. Obviously, these images before and after the permutation are unchanged, that is, the corresponding images satisfy P 0 = P 0 , P 1 = P 1 , . . ., P 255 = P 255 . Hence, we only need to focus on all intermediate states from the permutation-images to the cipher-images. Recall the description of MPPS, the DNA coding and diffusion operations after the permutation are carried out in the r, g and b planes of the images respectively. To reveal the keys of these planes, a divide-and-conquer strategy is adapted in the cryptanalysis as follows.
1) Cracking the r plane: In this plane, we will reveal the equivalent keys E 1 , D 1 , S 3 and S 4 . First, choose two special images P α1 , P α2 , which satisfy P α1 , P α2 ∈ P and P α1 P α2 = P 255 . Obviously, there are (C 1 4 ) 4 = 256 plain-image pairs in set P that meet. As mentioned earlier, their permutation-images are unchanged, i.e., P α1 = P α1 and P α2 = P α2 . Subsequently, in the r plane of P α1 and P α2 , each of two-bit elements (denoted as x 1 = α1 mod 4 and x 2 = α2 mod 4) is DNA encoded (f i (x k )), transformed (Eqs. (8, 9) ) and decoded(f −1 j (x k )), then the output I R1s (k) can be represented in two forms
Property 2 and Eq. (14), the differential ∆I R1s (k) satisfies
According to the above equation, if the output ∆I R1s (k) is known, then S 3 (k) can be uniquely determined. Fortunately, by Property 1 and Eq. (12), ∆I R1s (k) can be obtained by dividing ∆ C r (i) into four two-bit elements, and the differential pixel ∆ C r (i) is available from ∆C r (i) . So the binary sequence S 3 is revealed.
The next goal is to obtain E 1 , D 1 and S 4 . Since the key space of E 1 and D 1 is very small, only 8 × 8 = 64, we design an effective exhaustive search method for the keys, as summarized in Algorithm 1. The main idea is that we reveal same S 4 for different plain-images when the exhaustive key E 1 and D 1 are correct. Also, considering x ∈ Z 4 for F E1,D1 (x) and G E1,D1 (x), so we choose only four special image pairs (P 0 , C 0 ), (P 85 , C 85 ), (P 170 , C 170 ), and (P 255 , C 255 ), which correspond to different plain-pixel values (00000000) 2 , (01010101) 2 , (10101010) 2 and (11111111) 2 , respectively. Before Algorithm 1 is executed, the plain-image C u will be converted to an intermediate image CC u , u = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Formula (11) first can be converted to
Furthermore, one has
The above equation shows that one can obtain three subimages from C, i.e., Table V . For example, suppose MPPS encrypts the r plane with E 1 = 0 and D 1 = 0, then the remaining 15 elements of the equivalent key class II can be used to decrypt. The reasons for the results are as follows:
• F i,j (x) and G i,j (x) are two kind of transformations of the r plane. From Property 3, there are 8 and 16 satisfied maps of F i,j (x) and G i,j (x), respectively, rather than the expected 8 × 8 = 64. Hence, there are several maps that are equivalent for different i, j ∈ Z 8 . • S 4 also has multiple equivalent keys. S 
4 (k)f orx = 0, 1, 2, 3, are holds, where x ∈ Z 4 , i, j, i , j ∈ Z 8 and k = 1 ∼ 4M N . The above proposition is equivalent to Properties 4 and 5. Note that these equivalent key sets in Table V are not finalized, because DNA encoding rule f E1 is constrained by Eq. (10), and we will further filter to obtain the correct keys in the next subsection.
2) Cracking the green and blue planes: This subsection we will crack the g and b planes and further determine a correct set of equivalent keys for r plane.
First, in the g plane, we also apply the exhaustive search method with the same four plain-images and intermediate cipher-image, which is similar to Algorithm 1. But the exhaustive algorithm needs to consider the DNA coding rules f E1 since the g plane is related to r plane, Overall, it needs to search 8 × 8 × 8 = 512 times. Then we will reveal an equivalent set of {(E 1 , E 2 , D 2 , S 5 S 4 S 6 )}, and further filter a new equivalent key set of r plane.
Similarly, we will obtain another equivalent key set of {(E 2 , E 3 , D 3 , S 6 S 4 )} plane and the existing equivalent key sets of g is refined. Finally, we confirm the right sets of {S 6 } and {S 5 } 2 . 
represents j th different keystream S 4 in the i th equivalent classes, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Since the value of S 3) Revealing permutation key: Except for permutation index S 1 , now we obtain all the equivalent keys or equivalent key sets in Table IV . So, we can recover the permutationimage P for any cipher-image C. Then it becomes a classic cryptanalysis of permutation-only cipher problem, which has been studied in depth in [27] , [28] . The general way is to use the multi-fork tree optimization method [27] . To attack MPPS, only log 256 (3MN) plain-images are extra chosen, here x returns the nearest integers more than or equal to x.
C. Attack process and simulation results
The above theoretical analysis demonstrate that MPPS is successfully broken with only log 256 (3M N ) + 4 chosen plain-images. Here, a complete attack example to verify the proposed cryptanalysis method will be given.
For better presentation, assume that MPPS processes a RGB color image of size 2 × 2 × 3, and the pixel value of each plane range from 0 to 255. In the following simulation, set the initial iteration of CLS or CTS map t 0 = 500, and six original keys of MPPS as listed in the second column of the Table VI. Accordingly, the equivalent key corresponding to the each original key is calculated by an Initialization procedure of MPPS.
As shown in Fig. 1 , we select two group of images to obtain all the equivalent keys of MPPS. The first group includes four special plain-images and cipher-images as From Eq. (20, 21) , the diffusion between pixels can be eliminated and a intermediate image CC u , u ∈ {0, 255, 85, 170} can be created: {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0} . 
Print keys E 1 , D 1 and S 4 ; Then, input four pairs of images, (P 0 , CC 0 ), (P 85 , CC 85 ), (P 170 , CC 170 ), (P 255 , CC 255 ), into Algorithm 1 with S 3 . As a result, the matching equivalent keys E 1 , D 1 (DNA encoding/decoding rule index) are successfully searched, and the corresponding keystreamsŜ 4 are also output. Similarly, multiple matching equivalent keys
) of g and b plane, can be obtained by the key search method, respectively, whereŜ 4 = S 4 ,Ŝ 5 = S 5 S 5 S 6 andŜ 6 = S 6 S 4 . The corresponding results are shown in Table VII . Note that these searched keys need to be further filtered because some of them are wrong. For example, E 1 = 2, 7, 1 or 5 are the wrong keys because they don't appear in both key search results (the first and second columns). Now we choose another group of images to obtain the permutation index S 1 , it includes log 256 (3 × 2 × 2) = 1 image. Such as a pair of plain-image and cipher-image: Then using DNA subtraction (the inverse of Eq. 10) and DNA decoding (the inverse of Eqs. 8 and 9), one can get a scrambled image Pnew = {8, 0, 9, 1, 10, 4, 6, 2, 11, 5, 3, 7}.
By comparing the positions of the same pixels between P new and P new , a permutation index sequence 10, 2, 11, 5, 7, 3, 12, 6, 4, 8} (23) can be obtained.
In general, by choosing five pairs of plain-images and cipher-images, we can uniquely determine the equivalent keys S 1 and S 3 , which are consistent with Table VI. In addition, we have eight different (E 1 , D 1 ,Ŝ 4 ), eight (E 2 , D 2 ,Ŝ 5 ) and sixteen (E 3 , D 3 ,Ŝ 6 ), so there are 8 × 8 × 16 = 1024 groups of equivalent keys in total, and one of them is the same as in Table VI . Therefore, the proposed attack is effective and feasible.
D. Evaluation on other attack analysis
In [26, Sec. IV], the performance of MPPS was analyzed from eight aspects. In this subsection, we question their credibility one by one as follows.
1) Key space: The statement "it can be evident that the coupled chaotic map achieves amplified chaotic range in the entire region of [0, 4]" in [26] is questionable. The size of each sub-figure in [26, Fig. 1 ] is about 0.9 inch by 0.9 inch. Assume that the adopted dpi (dots per inch) is 200, the number of the printed dots is only about 32,400. Observing [26, Fig. 1 ], one can see that the distribution is not uniform.
Since symmetry in fixed-point arithmetic domain for initial value of CCS (1) and CLT (3) (namely, the initial values Y (0) and (1 − Y (0)) will generate the same dynamic behavior), the effective key space of the MPPS is reduced by half. On the other hand, the initial values Y (0) = 0, 0.5 or 1.0 are the fixed points of CCS and CLT, which correspond to some weak keys of the MPPS. In addition, the key space of K 2 is estimated to be 10 28 in [26] , but its actual key space is only 8 6 = 2
18
since six kinds of DNA encoding /decoding rules. Further, considering DNA encoding properties (Property 2, Property 3), it will generate a part of weak keys and equivalent keys. In general, the key space of MPPS is far overestimated. 2) Key Sensitivity: As analyzed in [28] - [30] , there are many equivalent secret-key due to the dynamics degradation of chaotic system in a finite-precision computer.
3) Statistical Attack: Histogram analysis and entropy are unrelated with any security performance of an encryption scheme [29] , [30] . 
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5) Chosen-plaintext attack: One specific relationship between plain-image and the corresponding cipher-image is almost unrelated with the capability of an encryption scheme against chosen-plaintext attack.
6) Cropping Attack: If the encryption process is not related with the plain-image, any encryption scheme is robust against cropping attack. 7) Performance Comparison: As emphasize in [25] , any encryption scheme should target at a specific application scenario. Otherwise, the balancing point among usability, security and efficiency is unclear.
E. Other defects 1) Practical consideration: In [26, Sec. III], it is stated that "selection of a region of interest and region of non-interest is solely left to the user under the recommended physician". In addition, MPPS "requires the user's feed that specifies the number of rounds of operation". So it requires professional training for the ordinary patients.
2) Efficiency: As analyzed in [29] , conversion functions (4), (6) waste much computation on the discard bits. To generate a sequence of length six X 2 , t 2 = 100 states are sacrificed.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed security and practical performances of a medical privacy protection scheme based on DNA encoding and chaos. Some of its properties were derived and used to obtain the equivalent secret key of the scheme with some chosen plain-images. Much works need to be done to bridge the gap between DNA computing and multimedia security.
